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CIA: U.S. Paradox

Secrecy to Protect an Open Society

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Fidel Castro's release of three agents of the Central Intelligence Agency points up the role that the CIA has played—and still is playing—in U.S. relations with Cuba and with other foreign countries.

The CIA agents were among the 27 American prisoners who Castro swapped to the United States for four of his followers who had been held in this country for violation of state and federal laws.

Though the CIA agents had been picked up in Havana in the course of the usual CIA task of spying on the enemy, the CIA has played a much larger role in Cuba than spying.

Dulles Gives Data

Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy's authority for the statement that the CIA assumed the responsibility for planning the abortive 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion because American manpower, American airpower and American ships were not to be used.

This actual participation in a military operation has led at least one writer, Andrew Tully, to declare that the CIA today exerts as much influence as does the State Department on American foreign policy.

Americans know little about the CIA, although the public hears more about CIA failures—as in Cuba—than its successes. Few members of Congress really know what CIA is doing. And the disastrous U-2 incident during President Eisenhower's administration showed that the executive department does not always keep a close check on whether



- AP Wirephoto

ALLEN W. DULLES Informed of Perils

on the CIA's general role by Allen W. Dulles, who retired after 11 years with the CIA following the 1961 Cuban fiasco, in an article in Harper's magazine.

Dulles avoids the details of the 1961 invasion, but repeats what he has said before. That he knew of no estimate that a spontaneous uprising of the unarmed population of Cuba would or should be touched off by the landing.

If Dulles' estimate was correct, and some Pentagon spokesmen had a different view, the question is how the CIA expected to mount a successful invasion with a force of only 1,500 men when Castro could call out more than 200,000 men. Dulles doesn't explain.

Some of the public concern about the CIA stems from lack of knowledge of its purposes and from the fact that American interest in foreign relations is of comparatively recent date.

American Doubts

Concern also stems from the CIA's role in the making of

decision-making level with its role often undisclosed until the events become history.

But most of the concern no doubt arises from the fact that most Americans find spying distasteful, if not immoral, and find it difficult to justify dirty tricks being played on anyone, even enemies.

Dulles insists that at CIA he tried to keep secret only those activities which should be secret and tried not to make a mystery out of what was obvious or a matter of common knowledge.

Reporters would not agree that he always succeeded in these aims, even though he was more approachable than many other intelligence officials.

Dulles says the national security act set up the CIA in 1947 because of "our growing appreciation of the nature of the Communist menace, its self-imposed secrecy and the security measures behind which it prepares its nuclear missile threat and its subversive penetration of the Free World."

World War II, according to former President Truman, taught the United States that "we had to collect intelligence in a manner that would make the information available where it was needed and when it was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form."

1st Intelligence Unit

As Dulles says, a close-knit, co-ordinated intelligence service, able to report accurately and quickly on developments in almost any part of the globe, is the best insurance we can have against surprise. Yet it is not complete insurance, as the surprise Soviet introduction of missiles into Cuba proved.

One earlier form of intelligence service in the United States was Section 8 of Military Intelligence which in World War I became known as the "Black Chamber." It was a unit which claimed as its

outstanding achievement the breaking of the Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers.

Lesson Was Learned

But when Henry L. Stimson became secretary of state under President Hoover in 1929, he refused to let the State Department use the services of the "Black Chamber." His reason? "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

Later, however, Stimson served as secretary of war in President Roosevelt's cabinet and came to appreciate the importance of intelligence.

Stimson had expressed the typical American reluctance to use spying and other underhanded means to acquire information, even about an enemy. Dulles addresses himself to this same issue in Harper's article:

"Is it necessary . . . for the United States with its high ideals and its traditions to involve itself in espionage to invade the privacy of other people's territory, to break other